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Abstract. In modern political science, repeated elections are considered as the main mechanism of electoral accountability in democracies. More rarely, elections are considered as ways to select "good types" of politicians. In this article it is argued that historical republican authors interpreted elections in this last sense. They view elections as a means to select what they often called the "natural aristocracy", virtuous political leaders that would pursue the common good. This argument is presented in three steps.
First, it is claimed that republican authors did not considered retrospective accountability as one of the goals of electoral processes. Second, I present some evidence concerning the distinction in republican authors between two types of politicians, "good" and "bad". And, finally, I present some republican arguments about how elections could serve as a device for selecting the "good" politicians.
individuals, it is consistently demonstrated that only a small minority of the public pays attention to politics and is reasonably well informed about politicians and political issues. 9 In fact, it is often assumed that this lack of information is, to a great extent, rational: the investment in gathering and processing political information is costly and the payoffs of this investment are uncertain (given the low probability that the formation of well-founded political opinions by the citizen will have any impact in real policies).
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Besides this problem of asymmetric information between representatives and constituents, there are another two limits to electoral accountability: electoral heterogeneity makes it possible for officials to play off some voters against others to undermine their accountability to anyone and, given that electoral accountability operates periodically, officials can also avoid electoral responsibility for particular actions by grouping unpopular actions with popular ones.
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We have, then, an agent model where the principal apparently has no incentives to invest in information about his agent's behavior and, as a consequence, the agent has no incentives to fulfill the interests of the principal.
Given the problems of elections as tools to make politicians accountable, Fearon has proposed to see elections, instead, as a means to select "good types". 12 As Fearon puts it "there is no logical reason why elections must be understood as a part of a relationship of accountability or agency. 13 For example, a group of people may understand elections as a means of selecting or conferring honor on the best or most distinguished person". This theory is based on assumptions about electors' behavior completely different from the assumptions of the retrospective theory of elections as 9 John R. Zaller (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16 6 mechanisms of accountability. First, accountability theories implicitly assume that there are no differences in the competence and integrity of politicians. However, politicians do differ in their competence or integrity. On the one hand, a great part of the debate in a campaign is referred neither to the content of the future policies nor to the performance of the government but to the personal attributes of the candidates. The parties spend many efforts in devaluating with ethical accusations of corruption or dishonesty the candidate of the competing party. On the other hand, the electors put a high value on candidates' honesty and principles. Second, accountability models also assume that citizens believe that they can evaluate the government for its performance, that is, that citizens can interpret whether government policies are implemented in their behalf. These two assumptions, as we have said, are not very realistic. If we take into account the information problems of citizens to interpret the consequences of government's policies and the differences in the politicians' types, it is more probable that citizens understand the vote as a means of selecting good politicians rather than of punishing governments for a bad past performance.
According to Fearon "good types" are those politicians who share electors'
interests, have moral integrity and are competent. 14 To distinguish "good types" from "bad types" citizens can use a variety of signals. For instance, citizens' welfare could be a relevant signal for electors of the competence of the government they have. Non policy cues about the character of the politicians are also relevant pieces of information for the selection model. In this sense, it could be argued that the fulfillment of electoral promises can be an informative signal of politicians' credibility. In the theories based on the prospective behavior of electors, promises were a source of information for the future policies of the government. In Fearon's view, the fulfillment of promises is also important but as a signal of government honesty. Credibility is one of the variables that citizens use to select their governments. For this reason, a switch, for example, from popular catch-all policies during campaign to hard economic adjustment when in office can damage governments.
In the rest of this paper, I will argue that republican authors considered elections as a form of selecting "good types", much in line with Fearon's arguments, instead of as a way to make government accountable. By republican authors, I mean a tradition in political theory that ranges from Cicero in the Roman Republic, the civic humanist of the Renaissance in Italy (especially Machiavelli), James Harrington and his
Commonwealth of Oceana in the seventeenth century to some other authors in the eighteenth century, including most prominently Montesquieu in France, the radical Whigs in England and the American revolutionaries. 15 These authors had in common a similar idea of freedom, most famously depicted by Pettit as "freedom as nondomination", and a similar concern for the common good as the main goal of the political process. Nevertheless, there are important differences among them in issues related to the role of government or the extent of citizen's participation in the polity.
These differences had often led to distinguish between two strands of republicanism, labeled as conservative and democratic, or, probably more accurately, a tradition that emphasizes participation in self-government and a second tradition focused in the rule of law as the basis of individual freedom. 16 As we will see in the next sections, the existence of at least these two strands in the classical republican thought is also reflected in differences in the interpretation of elections. Authors of the, say, "conservative" strand, like Cicero, Guicciardini or Hamilton differed from authors of the "democratic"
or "participatory" strand in their views about the capacity of the people to select good politicians or about the probability of virtue among political representatives. However, the idea that I will try to develop in this paper is that all of them considered elections as a selection device instead than a mechanism for retrospective accountability. And, although elections in Republican Rome were different in many important points from elections in the American Republic or even the Italian city-republics of the Renaissance, I think that some aspects of elections, specifically their function as selection device or as mechanism of accountability, are sufficiently general to made intelligible a discussion, say, between Cicero's and Guicciardini's views about these specific aspects of elections.
I will present the idea that these authors viewed elections mainly as a mechanism to select "good types" in three steps. First, I will sustain that republican authors rarely considered elections as a mechanism of accountability. Instead, they considered other ways to control the government. Second, I will show that these authors considered elections as a way of selecting good types, or, as they usually said, to select the "natural aristocracy". Third, I will present some of the mechanisms presented by these authors in order to explain how this "natural aristocracy" could be selected by the people.
Republicanism, accountability and the selection of good types
Republican authors, from Cicero to the Founders of the American Republic, were obsessed with the problem of how to assure that governments would respect the common good of the res publica, how to avoid arbitrary power. "the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people (…) they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be renewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised". 27 This idea was advanced also in Federalist number 52.
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Actually, the republican tradition is usually associated to other mechanisms rather than to elections in order to avoid the danger of arbitrary power, factionalism or corruption. The theory of mixed government, the separation of powers and the theory of checks and balances are probably the most well-known institutional devices Therefore, republicans rarely considered elections as mechanisms of accountability.
In fact, the retrospective evaluation of the policies of the government at the end of each term, either through competitive elections or through the appointment of special committees to control magistrates, was very uncommon in the republican thought, apart from the institutional practice in ancient Athens and some of the Italian city republics of the Renaissance. Some of the measures recommended by republicans to control the government were, indeed, incompatible with an interpretation of elections as mechanisms of accountability. Term limits is the most obvious example. If the incumbent cannot run for office in the next election, she has no incentives to anticipate the sanction of the electorate for her policies and, therefore, the election cannot fulfill its role as a mechanism of accountability.
Why did not republican authors consider elections as mechanisms of accountability?
There are at least two possibilities: either they considered elections as imperfect mechanisms to make politicians accountable or they considered retrospective evaluations of the incumbent's performance, in general, unnecessary. I do not think that the first one was the case. As we have seen, there was not much room in the republican thought to the view of elections as mechanisms of accountability and, therefore, neither to the problems associated to it. Some of these problems, as I mentioned before, have to do with information asymmetries between representatives and constituents. Essay number IV, he considered that "A great part of the people will probably not know the characters of their own members, much less that of a majority of those who will compose the federal assembly". 42 There was, therefore, certain recognition of the existence of these information asymmetries in some of the authors. But the information asymmetries mentioned by Machiavelli and Brutus were related to the character of the representatives, not to their policies. In fact, both authors were pointing to the problems of elections as mechanisms to select good types, not as mechanisms of accountability.
Therefore, it does not seem that the reason to exclude elections as mechanisms of accountability was the problem of asymmetric information between representatives and constituents. Consider now the second explanation advanced above: that they viewed retrospective evaluation of the incumbent's performance irrelevant. Obviously, control of the government was a key issue for republican authors. We have seen the various institutional mechanisms advanced by them in order to control the government: dispersion of power, bill of rights, judicial review and scrutiny of the politician's performance at the end of the term. Only the last one resembles clearly a mechanism of accountability through a retrospective evaluation of the performance in office of the incumbent. As we have seen, this mechanism was extensively used in the cases of ancient Athens and the Italian city-republics of the Renaissance. My idea here is that republicans did not thought in elections as mechanisms of accountability because they considered that elections as mechanisms of selecting "good types", what they sometimes called (since Harrington's Oceana) the "natural aristocracy", would be enough to achieve a virtuous government. If citizens select good types in the elections, they will achieve, at least in theory, the same result as if elections worked as pure 40 Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta, " for example, proposed the establishment of a Senate to check the behavior of the gonfaloniere a vita? They probably thought that elections were, at best, imperfect ways to select good types, mainly due to lack of wisdom in the people (a recurrent topic in many of the republican authors, especially the more anti-democratic ones). Probably, they also considered those institutional mechanisms as separation of powers and checks and balances imperfect controls. Indeed, the presence of a third-part to enforce the contract between the principal and his agent (for example, a judicial system) certainly improves this enforcement, even if the third-part only intervenes randomly, but does not exclude the possibility of being cheated by the agent. 45 Republican authors were aware of this: not even the most perfect institutional design excludes a certain degree of discretion by the representative. 46 Given that both elections as mechanisms to select the natural aristocracy and institutional devices like separation of powers and checks and balances were imperfect considered separately, they advocated for a combination of both measures in order to avoid arbitrary power.
It is interesting to notice that the presence of ulterior mechanisms of retrospective evaluation of the incumbent's performance while in office were only judged necessary when elections as mechanisms for selecting good types were not available. As we have mentioned, the appointment of special committees to scrutiny the behavior of the 43 Fearon (n. 3). This is an important difference between Fearon's conception of what constituted "good types" of politicians and the republican conception. For Fearon, good types are those that shared the voters' interests. However, for most of the republicans, voting was not a means of combining divergent interests or, as Arrow claimed, a means of preference aggregation. For them it is a process that searches the common good of the community. This can coincide (or not) with majority vote. Therefore, in order to be a "good type" of politician in republican terms sharing the interest of the constituents is not enough. It would be necessary for those interests to coincide with the common good of the republic. magistrates at the end of their term was common in ancient Athens and the Italian cityrepublics. In both cases, lot was the privileged way of selecting public officials. Given that public officials were selected randomly, there was no way to know in advance if those selected were virtuous or not. That is, selection by lot is not a good way to differentiate between "good" and "bad" types of politicians. This was adequately perceived by Harrington in Oceana: in ancient Athens, as the magistrates were selected by lot, they did not include the "natural aristocracy". 47 Given that selection by lot is incapable of screening to differentiate between types, an ex post mechanism of accountability -the scrutiny by especial committees-was more necessary in Athens and the Italian city republics than in a polity were elections were designed precisely to select good types.
It could be convenient to sum up the ideas presented so far. I have claimed that republican authors did not consider elections as mechanisms of accountability.
Although I am not sure which is the explanation for this, one possibility is that they considered enough, in order to avoid arbitrary power, a previous mechanism of screening, to select ex ante good types for the public offices, combined with various institutional controls to the politicians while in office, like separation of powers and checks and balances. My idea is that elections, for republicans, were that mechanism of screening. This is what I will try to demonstrate next.
To demonstrate that republicans considered elections as mechanisms for selecting good types of politicians, I will present an argument in two steps. First, I will show that republicans thought that politicians could be two types: good or bad. This is necessary, because if politicians belonged just to one type (if all of them are good or all of them are bad), the selection of good types is trivial. Second, I will present some republican arguments about how elections can serve as mechanisms for selecting good types.
The virtue of representatives
For many republican authors, the representatives of the people could indeed be virtuous and, consequently, trustworthy. Cicero in considering that virtue, and the characteristics associated to it, is a "trustwarranting property". Did the republicans think that there were "good" and virtuous politicians ready to be selected by the people? Cicero indeed thought so. He recognized that many politicians were not trustworthy: for him, the highest injustice is from those that pretend to be honest when they are cheating you and these injustices are more often found in politics. 51 Nevertheless, he considered that there were virtuous politicians. In pro Sestio he explicitly mentioned two types of politicians: "optimates", who sought to please all the best men, and "populares", demagogues who sought to please the masses. 52 These two types corresponded to his ideas of "good" and "bad" types of politicians, respectively. Although he does not explicitly mention the notion of "natural aristocracy", he considered that these "good" types of politicians, people superior in virtue and in spirit, have been provided by nature. leaders, providing that they had been selected adequately. 54 Guicciardini considered that the political leaders, the optimates, had intelligence and prudence. 55 The second one, at least, is a trust-warranting property. He even thought (as, actually, Cicero did) that the optimates, the few, were the only ones capable of virtue. 56 This is not to say that he considered that all potential politicians were trustworthy or, in our terminology, "good types". His defense of the mixed government and other controls was based, among other things, on his fear of the corruption of the ottimati if they had a monopoly of power. He considered that all the ottimati had two virtues especially adequate for government:
practical experience and the pursuit of honor, but his fear against warranting to the aristocracy a monopoly of power reflected the view that much of the aristocrats were not virtuous enough. 57 The most famous characterization of the virtue of representatives is captured in the notion of "natural aristocracy". It was a contribution of James Harrington in his
Commonwealth of Oceana. 58 It implied that, in any polity, certain men would possess greater talent than others. This percentage of "wiser men", always present in all human societies, is the natural aristocracy, "diffused by God throughout the whole body of mankind". 59 The idea of a representative assembly of the more virtuous was shared by the other authors of the "neo roman" British tradition. 60 The concept of natural aristocracy was also extensively used by the American revolutionaries. They generally considered the Senate as the adequate place for this "natural aristocracy". 61 Jefferson mentioned the term frequently, and viewed his proposal for educative reform as a way to open the society's "natural aristocracy" to all talents. 62 He considered that this "natural aristocracy" was grounded in virtue and talents and that it was "the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts and government of society". 63 In this, he agreed with John Adams, who also frequently mentioned the notion of "natural aristocrats". 64 In The Federalist Papers there are also frequent references to the virtue of representatives. Against some interpretations that consider Federalist number 10 as a rejection of classical republicanism and the idea of civic virtue, it seems that the representatives' virtue was at the heart of Madison's defense of the Constitution. 65 He considered that representatives were "citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of country will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations". 66 In all republics, Madison said, there is always a given percentage of virtuous men fit for the role of representatives.
Hamilton also considered in Federalist number 76 that "the institution of delegated power implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind". 67 This is the idea captured in Agrippa's Letter XV, when it says that in government there will probably be more bad men than good ones. It seems, then, that republican authors indeed considered the existence of two types of politicians: good and bad. I go next to the second step of my argument: how they considered that the people could differentiate between the two types.
The selection of good types
In Republicans vary in their confidence in the capacity of the people to select good leaders. In this case, the more conservative authors usually considered the people incapable of virtue but capable of selecting good leaders. Cicero, for example, thought that the common people (the "many poor") were ignorant and ready to be governed by their passions. 76 Guicciardini easily agreed with this: the members of Florence's Great
Council were "poor and ignorant", and they had "little capacity". 77 However, both also agreed that, despite these preferences, the people tend to elect good representatives, probably because they know that their interests are best served by the few virtuous (although this did not mean that the people's capacity to select good leaders was perfect). Cicero thought that the popular assembly could easily distinguish between serious politicians and demagogues. 78 For Guicciardini, the many are differentiated from the few by their capacity to judge of others' fitness for offices they do not 76 Cicero (2000 themselves seek. 79 The people, Guicciardini said, know wise and prudent politicians by their reputation and fame, and this is enough for them to distribute wisely most of the magistracies (although sometimes he was not so confident about the capacity of the people to select good leaders for the highest magistracies, like Florence's gonfaloniere). 80 According to Montesquieu, numerous examples in Greece and Rome showed that in elections the people are capable of discerning the merit of the most capable. 81 Madison shared Cicero and Guicciardini's rather conservative view that common people were not capable of virtue, and so were ready to constitute factions in order to pursue their selfish interests against the common good of the Republic. 82 According to him, the problem lies in the fact that certain kinds of information cannot be acquired by private means, but only by "actual service in the legislature". 83 That is, he thought that some information was intrinsically politicians' private information so people cannot rule by themselves and cannot even judge the political proposals of politicians adequately. Madison and some of the Founders had some doubts about the capacity of the people to select good representatives. Although Madison said in Federalist number 55 that the genius of the American people would prevent the election of tyrants, 84 he usually considered the people apt to be dominated by their passions. 85 governed by their passions. 87 Other Federalist, like Jonathan Jackson, considered that the people were incapable not just of governing but of selecting good representatives.
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The more democratic republican writers rejected this conservative and anti-democratic view of the people's preferences. Machiavelli is a good example of this. He considered the people generally prudent and wise (actually wiser and more prudent than princes). 89 Some of the commonwealthmen of sixteenth-century England shared Machiavelli's view. Algernon Sidney, for example, considered that a popular assembly could be capable of some passions and be deceived, but they are not so easily deceived as one man. 90 Thomas Paine also considered the people wise and prudent, and added that the better guarantee for individual rights (including the property right) was indeed a popular government. 91 Jefferson's model of agrarian democracy was very optimistic about the probability of the attainment of an enlightened citizenship through public education and the autonomy given by the possession of land. In general terms, he believed in the "integrity and good sense" of the common man. 92 The more optimistic of the American revolutionaries, like Jefferson, actually stressed the capacity of the common people to elect those who had integrity and merit. 93 In Jefferson words: "leave to the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from the chaff. In general they will elect the real good and wise". The measures related to the electoral rules stressed the frequency of the elections, the size of the electoral districts and the requisite of property for representatives.
The aim of the advocates of maximum frequency of elections was to assure that the interests of the representatives and the interest of the people were the same. Thomas
Paine, the Antifederalists and authors like John Adams considered that the best way for the representatives to have the same interests as the people is that the assembly was an exact portrait of the people at large. 95 The dissenters in the Convention of Pennsylvania, for example, thought that without a representation possessing the same interests, feelings and views "which the people themselves would possess, were they all assembled", the outcome would be lack of confidence of the people in their representatives. 96 As Melancton Smith would say, the representatives "should be a true picture of the people". 97 This same idea is advanced by Thomas Paine in Common Sense. 98 If elections were very frequent, the representatives could not separate themselves from the people. Applying this principle, all the States of revolutionary America but South Carolina, established annual elections for their representatives.
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Notice that the frequency of the elections was not seen as a mechanism of accountability but as a way of selecting "good types" of representatives: politicians that shared the people's interests.
The size of the electoral districts was also a measure to select good types of representatives. Here the positions were very different, from those that advocated small districts to those that defended districts as big as possible. Those that thought that the representatives should be a true picture of the people were in favor of small districts.
This was the position of the Antifederalists. For example, Brutus considered that the smaller the district, the more probable that the representatives resembled the people. 100 The reason is that in small districts it is easier to know the character of the potential representatives. At the other extreme we find Madison, the advocate of big districts.
Madison did not think that representatives should resemble the people as much as possible. In fact, he thought that the virtue of the representatives meant precisely that they had to be different from the people: they would have more prudence, wisdom and experience than the people. Big districts would mean a great distance between the representatives and the people and, therefore, more difference between them. 101 In the words of the Federalist James Wilson, large electoral districts were a protection against both "petty demagogues and parochialism".
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The other electoral rule occasionally advocated by republicans was a requisite of property for representatives. He thought that the people could always select good politicians using as a signal their quality as orators, although sometimes he considered that the people were deceived by demagogues, like the Gracci. We can interpret that Cicero thought that the people could select real good types but sometimes selected bad types that mimicked the behavior of good types. Nevertheless, he also considered that, in the long run, virtue could not be imitated successfully. 113 Montesquieu considered frugality a good signal of virtue. 114 Finally, as we have seen, the Antifederalist writers, and other American revolutionaries, like John Adams, considered likeness to the people as the surest signal of the representative sharing the interests of his constituents.
However, not all authors agreed about the capacity to select good politicians by the use of cues and heuristics about the politicians' personal characteristics. We have seen that Machiavelli thought that, in the elections, the people used the surest signals about the politicians' personal characteristics, and he even concedes that these pieces of information about personal characteristics are a reasonable shortcut to select good agents. 115 However, as we have also seen, in various passages of The Prince and the Discorsi, Machiavelli considered that the governors had a wide capacity of mimicking signals associated to "trust-warranting properties". 116 Contrary to Cicero, he thought that the imitation of virtue was not only possible but indefinitely successful, because men are candid and prone to self-deceit. 117 If bad types can mimic the behavior of good types, the use of heuristics is a precarious base for political judgment. 118 Therefore, Machiavelli's counsel to the people was that in order to establish a free republic, it is necessary to think that all men are bad and untrustworthy. 119 We can interpret the proposals of those authors that advocated for an educational reform to enhance the enlightenment of the people in this light. Take 
Conclusion
In this paper I have defended the idea that republican authors did not interpret elections as mechanisms of accountability but as a way of selecting "good types", politicians that would pursue the common good, instead of their factional interests. I have tried to demonstrate that republicans envisaged a combination of elections to select the "natural aristocracy" of society and controls for governors while in office to keep the public officials free from corruption. I have presented my argument in two steps.
First, I have demonstrated that republican authors considered that politicians could be two types, good and bad. Second, I have presented some republican ideas about how the elections could serve to select the good types. Some of these ideas are, curiously, quite similar to a recent stream of literature in political science about the use of cues and stereotypes, have pronounced overconfidence in their political opinions, they are extremely resistant to incorporate new information, are readily influenced by "easy arguments" that do not provide much information and, finally, they usually employ untrustworthy signals to judge political messages. Bartels ((1996) "Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections", American Journal of Political Science 40 (1): 194-230), has also questioned the rationality of the use of heuristics in political choices. His conclusion is that political ignorance has systematic and significant consequences on political choices. He also claims that, in the aggregate, individual errors most probably do not cancel out, because they are not random, but are systematically biased in the same direction.
heuristics in order to make low informed political judgments. These ideas fall short, politicians by low-informed citizens remind similar ideas advanced by the historical republicans. However, it is doubtful that classical republicans have something to teach contemporary political science about elections, apart from the (not irrelevant) fact that some ideas considered "new" by modern political scientists are not really that "new".
